

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al (A F F I D A V I T
-vs- (of
ARAKI, Sadao, et al (MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

1. I, MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa, make oath and say as follows:
2. The contents of this affidavit are based on facts within my own knowledge and on conversations I have had with various people as hereinafter set forth.
3. I was born in Tokyo in 1893. I graduated from Peers School in 1912 and from the Imperial University of Kyoto Taisho 8. After graduating from college I became a lecturer at Meiji University. On graduating from college I was a lecturer of political science and European political philosophy at Meiji University for approximately 15 years. During this time I traveled in Europe, spending two years in England and two years in France. In 1930 when I succeeded to my father's title I also became a Member of the House of Peers. In June, 1936, when Marquis Kido resigned as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I was appointed his successor by the Minister of the Imperial Household, Matsudaira, Tsuneo. Upon the recommendation of Prince Saionji, Baron Harada and Marquis Kido, I served as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa, Kurahei, until June 1, 1940, and continued in this capacity as Chief Secretary to Marquis Kido until November 24, 1945.
4. I first met Marquis Kido at Peers School and became better acquainted with him when we were in the Imperial University of Kyoto. Marquis Kido succeeded to his father's title and became a Member of the House of Peers in 1917 and when I joined the House of Peers in

1930 I became even more intimate with him. We have been extremely friendly all these years and I have had an excellent opportunity to observe his work, ability, character and reputation from my intimate association with him and from working with him. While I was Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I became well acquainted with the historical background of the office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the duties and functions of the Lord Keeper. Prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (Nai Daijin) had official duties to perform but with the passage of time his office became a mere sinecure. It remained only in name. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 Prince Sanjo, Sanetomi, who had rendered meritorious service to the state in connection with the political reform, was appointed Nai Daijin (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) in 1885, the office being resuscitated specially for him. It was a mere honorary post. Following his death, Prince Tokudaiji, Grand Chamberlain, was concurrently appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1891.

5. The present Emperor assumed regency while very young. It was deemed necessary therefore to offer proper political guidance to him as the Prince Regent. In deference to the strong advocacy in evidence since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that the Imperial Court were clearly distinguished from the government, it was deemed improper for the Minister of the Imperial Household to offer such guidance to the Prince Regent. Nor would it be proper for a minister of state to engage in a court job because it would lead to the introduction of politics to the Imperial Court. The law governing the creation of the Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stipulated that the Lord Keeper should offer Joji Hohitsu to the Emperor which means the offering of advice to the Emperor from time to time by attending on His Majesty constantly. In consequence the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was called upon to take charge of this

job of advising the Prince Regent politically and this continued after he became Emperor.

6. Extra court affairs, that is, political affairs, started to become complicated both nationally and internationally about this time so that something was needed by way of liaison between the Emperor and the cabinet. Thus circumstances both in and out of the Imperial Court called upon the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to offer his Joji Hohitsu to the Emperor from time to time on political matters. This political advice was offered to the Emperor prior to any political action on his part so that the Emperor could make suggestions prior to definite action by responsible government officials but when the government had made a decision pursuant to the provisions of constitutional government, the Emperor abided by those decisions and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was prohibited from interfering with those decisions. It has been strongly and consistently demanded since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that a clear line of demarcation be drawn between the Imperial Court to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal belonged, and the government. The result has been that the official duties of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal as established by the law pertaining to his office, which law is a part of that governing the organization of the Department of the Imperial Household, were performed along those lines. The Lord Keeper is not empowered to take action against or interfere with those government officials whose responsibility was fixed under legal provisions and he had no legal responsibility therefor. The Lord Keeper, being appointed by the Emperor, was a court official pure and simple and was responsible solely to His Majesty, the Emperor.

7. In addition to Joji Hohitsu, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also had the duty of taking custody of the privy and state seals. When documents were sent to the office of the Lord Keeper he could not refuse to affix the privy or state seals to them if they

were sanctioned by the Emperor with the conditions stipulated in Koshikirei all fulfilled. He was not authorized to make critical comments on the contents of the documents. He was only empowered to examine whether the conditions for affixing the privy or state seals were legally fulfilled by the documents in question.

8. Due to changing conditions during the past twenty years a new duty devolved upon the Lord Keeper, that of recommending a new Prime Minister in the event of a cabinet change. Originally it was not the job of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

9. The following historical development was related to me by Prince Saionji, Count Makino, Mr. Yuasa, Kurahei, Marquis Kido, Baron Harada and others.

10. At every Cabinet change, the Emperor first used to inquire of the Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister. The Genro was defined to be a man who rendered outstanding services to the state by personally taking an active part in the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent political reforms, and who was granted a message by the Emperor, according special treatment due to Genro. At first there were several Genro or Elder Statesmen, but with the passage of time, they died one after another in quick succession. The vacancies, thus caused, could not be filled up, due to the above-mentioned definition of the Genro. Finally, Prince Saionji became the only surviving Genro. When he advanced in age, Prince Saionji was living at Okitsu. As he experienced growing difficulty in coming up to Tokyo every time he received an Imperial inquiry, he declined the honor to be inquired by the Emperor about a succeeding Prime Minister at a Cabinet changed. Therefore, His Majesty inquired of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about a succeeding Prime Minister, but in reply, Count Makino, then the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated that it would be proper for His Majesty to inquire of the Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister, because he believed

that Prince Saionji had intelligence enough to judge the home and foreign situation. In accordance with the reply of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Emperor inquired of Prince SAIONJI, Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister. As Prince SAIONJI, Genro had already declined the honor to be asked by the Emperor about a succeeding Prime Minister, on the ground of growing difficulty experienced by him in coming up to Tokyo, first, the Grand Chamberlain and later, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal made inquiry of the Genro, in pursuance of Imperial request. After seeking the Genro's view, he returned to Tokyo and reported it to the Throne. In case the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was prevented by some unavoidable circumstances from proceeding to Okitsu, His Chief Secretary visited the Genro for him. This practice was continued from Count Makino's time until the middle part of Mr. YUASA's tenure of office as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. But Prince SAIONJI, Genro, petitioned the Emperor to release him from the responsibility for replying to Imperial inquiries on the ground that he lost his confidence in his replies, as he not only further advanced in age, but his continued residence at Okitsu for a long time kept him out of touch with the actual situation. His Majesty was gracious enough to consider his petition sympathetically, so that when Prince KONOYE tendered his resignation to the Throne together with the resignation of his first Cabinet, His Majesty inquired of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal YUASA, about a succeeding Prime Minister. In order to enable the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to make a mature judgment and also assist him, the Emperor added in inquiring of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about a succeeding Prime Minister that he should submit his reply to the Throne after consulting the Genro. This practice was since kept up until the Genro's passing away. In consequence, Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in order to make a mature judgment, first separately visited the

ex-Premier's and the President of the Privy Council and had exchanges of views with them, after which he proceeded to the Genro. After consulting the Genro, he submitted his reply to the Throne on his own responsibility. Both Baron Harada and Marquis Kido told me that the idea of the Lord Keeper seeking advice from Senior Statesmen and then making a recommendation to the Throne originated from Prince SAIONJI. It was generally understood from custom that if his reply to the Imperial inquiry led to bad results, the Lord Keeper was not responsible therefor, because the responsibility of the acts of the Prime Minister were assumed by the Prime Minister when he took office and he was legally responsible for his own conduct of state affairs as provided in the Constitution. The responsibility of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal disappeared the moment he submitted his reply to the Throne and it was accepted by His Majesty. Should the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal forfeit Imperial confidence as the result of his reply to the Imperial inquiry, and which later proved unfortunate, he would not be permitted to stay in his post any longer. Hence the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was responsible to the Emperor alone.

11. Even before Marquis KIDO became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on June 1, 1940, he and I had discussed on several occasions the best method of procedure to be followed for the recommendation of a Prime Minister at a cabinet change. I recall that in June, 1939, we agreed that it would be better for the Lord Keeper to hold a conference with the Senior Statesmen and obtain their views rather than a procedure whereby the Lord Keeper would interview each of them separately. He told me at that time and I agreed with him that this method of procedure would eliminate speculation, rumors and malicious propaganda which would lead to political unrest as it was a danger that the Lord Keeper might be engaging in politics if he saw each of the ex-Premiers separately. Furthermore, by

obtaining their views in conference it would be possible to discuss all the facts objectively and the Senior Statesmen would be able to benefit from one another's views. We both further thought that no vote should be taken at the conference but that all the views of all the Senior Statesmen should be submitted to the Throne together with the Lord Keeper's recommendation. This was the procedure which Marquis KIDO followed when he became Lord Keeper and in the one instance where there was a Cabinet change while Marquis KIDO was Lord Keeper and while Prince SAIONJI was still alive I obtained Prince SAIONJI's recommendation and views on the succeeding Prime Minister and reported them to Marquis KIDO. This was on the occasion of the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet and the commencement of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet in July, 1940.

12. In order to understand why it was necessary to adopt a method of procedure for the recommendation of a new Prime Minister which would be above suspicion, a knowledge of the trials and tribulations of the office of the Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal prior to Marquis KIDO is necessary. The political strife of recent years in Japan involved a sharp controversy between the militarists and the liberalists. The militarists aimed at governing Japan as a self-complaisant and self-important Japan-nationalists, whereas the liberalists aimed at administering Japan as an international Japan-internationalists. Within the militaristic nationalist group there were two factions, each seeking to eliminate the other and seize control of the government. Prince SAIONJI, whom I knew very well, as the leader of the liberalists. On many occasions he talked to me about the necessity of maintaining international peace and the necessity of Japan's Government being conducted strictly in accordance with the Constitution. I know Prince SAIONJI submitted his opinions to the Emperor on many occasions strictly in accordance with those ideas and that His Majesty readily followed his advice.

and understood the Prince's political principles.

13. The group, which enjoyed Prince SAIONJI's trust and was on good terms with the Prince was headed by Count MAKINO and included Mr. YUASA, Kurohei, who succeeded the Count as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Prince SAIONJI trusted Prince KONOUE and Marquis KIDO of the rising generation and took trouble to extend guidance them. I know this from my contact and conversations with those people and also from Prince SAIONJI's private secretary, Baron HARADA. All of these men who advocated peaceful relations between nations and internationalism as national policies in general and pursued a pro-Western policy as a definite measure for the realization of those general policies were invariably excluded by the Army which was opposed to such policies. Hence they found themselves exposed to the danger of assassinations at various incidents, including the May fifteenth and February twenty-sixth incidents. Attempts were made on the life of Count MAKINO several times; Viscount SAITO, who succeeded him as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, fell a victim to the dagger of an assassin. Assassination of Mr. YUASA, Kurohei, who succeeded Viscount SAITO as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was attempted several times, though they failed. Plots and attempts to kill Marquis KIDO were made on three occasions, February 26, 1936, July 5, 1940, and August 15, 16, 1945. Cases of malicious propaganda against them as well as plots on their lives, were too many to be enumerated here. It may not be necessary to recapitulate them either, especially since they are widely known. In addition to those who were very close to Prince SAIONJI, just referred to, others who were regarded as Prince SAIONJI's friends, sharing in the Prince's political principles were either assassinated or exposed to the danger of assassination. The salient cases in point were Viscount K. TAKAHASHI, who was killed and Admiral OKADA, who was attacked.

14. The Emperor was like-minded as Prince SAIONJI, the Genro. In view of the fact that the Army and ultra-rightist groups had steadily encroached on the political field, the only surviving Genro Prince SAIONJI intended to make the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to act as bulwark against or deterrent upon dictatorship, espoused by the Army and others. This accounts for meticulous care taken by the Prince in choosing the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. All successive Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal were chosen by him for this specific purpose. When I had an interview with Prince SAIONJI, I heard this from him at first hand. Not only that, it may be also clear from the fact that the successive Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal, including MAKINO, SAITO, YUASA and KIDO, became targets of attack by the so-called young military officers and ultra-rightists since the country was gripped by political unrest. Further judging by talks which I had with Prince SAIONJI, Count MAKINO and others from time to time, it was clear that Marquis KIDO was trusted as most capable Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, which post then was held by Count MAKINO and that the Marquis vigorously assisted his superiors along lines of this policy. At that time, he studied the political situation in close touch with Baron HARADA, Prince SAIONJI's private secretary and Prince KONOYE. I recall that member of the House of Peers as I was, I frequently met and had exchanges of views with Marquis KIDO, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Baron HARADA, and Prince KONOYE.

15. It was during the March incident of 1931 and the Manchurian incident that activities of part of the Army and ultra-rightist groups first came to the fore in the political field, having far-reaching effects on Japan's trend, later. I recall that Marquis KIDO reminiscently told me about it years later as follows:

"When I became Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Count MAKINO, big affairs such as the March incident and the Manchurian incident cropped up one after another in quick succession within six months of my assumption of office. The March incident failed but we attached extreme importance to it, because it was a forerunner of the Army's attempts at launching on the political field to carry out national reforms. We thought it was a very serious affair. Therefore, I had talks with Prince KONOYE, Baron HARADA, private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, and others about it so as to stop it on the one hand and on the other, place politics on normal 'tracks'. Under guidance of Prince SAIONJI, I worked hard together with Prince KONOYE and others not only to accomplish this by guiding the Army as much as possible so as to prevent it from going to extremes, while taking up positions opposed to the situation, but also to strengthen political power for party politicians, that is, to ensure sound development for constitutional government. Incident after incident which cropped up later in quick succession, however, fast added to the Army's power, with the result that we failed to carry out our original plan to our great regret."

16. During the February 26th incident, Viscount SAITO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal under whom Marquis KIDO served as Chief Secretary, was assassinated, and Admiral OKADA, then Prime Minister, was also first thought to have shared the same fate. This called upon Marquis KIDO to make extraordinary efforts to avert further trouble which he did pursuant to Imperial wishes. As an aftermath of the incident, Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, then Minister of the Imperial Household, was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. This

necessitated the choice of a new Minister of the Imperial Household. Shortly after Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo was chosen as Minister of the Imperial Household in 1936 Marquis KIDO told me to the following effect:

"It was I who recommended Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo to the Throne as succeeding Minister of the Imperial Household and urged him to accept the offer. I was actuated by the burning desire to keep the Imperial Court at least free from infiltration of Army influences."

17. Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, had just returned home from England, where he represented Japan as Ambassador. He was also diplomatic envoy to the United States of America, and was branded by the Army as a pro-British and a pro-American leader. Marquis KIDO's moral courage in recommending him to the Throne as Minister of the Imperial Household in the midst of pressure from the Army cannot be too highly estimated. I recall that it frequently became the topic of conversation later when I had chats with Prince KONOYE and Baron HARADA. Both of them paid high tributes to Marquis KIDO for his moral courage of no mean order in recommending Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo to the Throne as Minister of the Imperial Household.

18. After I became Chief Secretary to YUASA, Kurahei, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO was appointed President of the Bureau of Peerage in the Imperial Household Department. In October, 1937, several months after the first KONOYE Cabinet was formed, the Marquis joined the Cabinet and became Minister of Education as successor to Mr. YASUI, who resigned. Falling back on my past connections with the Marquis, I was in touch with him to gather information about the Cabinet. On many occasions he told me he was paying the most serious thought to termination of hostilities with China at the earliest possible opportunity, greatly worried about the incessant extension of the China Affair. When he was

offered the portfolio of Education, he told me that he did not like to join a war cabinet, but he decided to join the Cabinet in compliance with Prince KONOYE's importunate request to put forth his efforts for restoration of peace with China as member of the Cabinet. Prince KONOYE also told me to the same effect.

19. Marquis KIDO joined the HIRANUMA Cabinet of 1939 as Minister of Home Affairs. This Cabinet was troubled so much with the question of strengthening the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact, that it was rumored to collapse from time to time. I was in close touch with Marquis KIDO at that time. Inasmuch as he was not a constituent member of the Five-Minister conference, however, to which the question was referred, the Marquis was not much acquainted with the contents of the question, so that I was not able to obtain much information from him. The Five-Minister conference met scores of times, and yet it failed to arrive at any conclusion. Meanwhile, the Army, which got fretfully impatient began to work on the outside, for the purpose of interesting the public in strengthening the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact. The inevitable result was that an alarming situation was created from the viewpoint of maintenance of peace and order. In consequence, I recall that Marquis KIDO in his capacity of Home Minister was greatly worried. He thought that the question must be handled most tactfully; because in case the Cabinet collapsed due to this question, the antagonism between the Army and Navy would come up to surface, causing unrest to the people; while should the Senior Statesmen and other leaders be wiped out by terroristic actions, the country would be plunged into a state of anarchy and disturbance, when it might be most probably come under the reign of extremists. I recall that he gave this question serious thought. When an anti-British and anti-American agitation broke out about that time, the Marquis in his capacity of Home Minister controlled it through orders and directions to the Chief

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of the Metropolitan Police Bureau and Director of Police Affairs in the Home Ministry. The measure, taken by him, however, was criticized by both those opposed to the extremists and the Army as well as by the pro-British and pro-American people, but his real intentions may be clearly seen from what was mentioned above. Both factions denounced him. One faction said he was too lenient, the other said he was too strict. I heard from Marquis INOUYE, Saburo, that in 1938 when he visited Germany as cultural envoy, von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs in an interview with him, cited Marquis KIDO as one of the leading pro-British and pro-American statesmen in Japan.

20. In 1940 when Mr. YUASA resigned as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on account of ill health, Marquis KIDO was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in succession to him. Prior to Marquis KIDO's appointment, Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, then Minister of the Imperial Household, who was responsible for recommending a succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Throne, invited me to express my opinion to him on the question of the succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He also told me to seek the view of Prince SAIONJI, the Genro. Accordingly, I spoke with Baron HARADA, private secretary of Prince SAIONJI, several times in Tokyo on this question. After ascertaining that the Prince, who was in Okitsu, recommended Marquis KIDO as succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I reported to Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household to that effect. I understood from Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household, that the Minister of the Imperial Household, sought the views of Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, outgoing Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who was confined to bed and Prince KONOYE too, who all recommended Marquis KIDO as succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I know of no military leaders who endorsed Marquis KIDO for this position. I know of none of the accused who either endorsed him or

took any active part in securing his appointment to this position.

21. When the question of concluding a tripartite alliance pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy under the second KONOYE Cabinet arose, Marquis KIDO feared that it might eventually cause a clash between Japan and America and told me to that effect several times. Marquis KIDO said he had talks with Prime Minister KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA about this point and told me once that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were of the opinion that this alliance was intended for averting war with America, but it was beyond his comprehension. I recall that he told me so in a disappointed manner.

22. True to his official duties to offer oji hohitsu or counsel to the Emperor from time to time, by constantly attending on His Majesty, Marquis KIDO refrained from commenting on the reports, submitted by the Ministers of State to the Emperor. In talks with me, however, he used to express his private views that he feared this alliance might move in a direction opposed to bringing about world peace, judging by actual politics, notwithstanding the phraseology of the alliance to the contrary, or might usher in war with America and Britain. Should things come to such a pass, the Marquis used to tell me that it would be a serious affair for Japan. The Marquis remained true to his official duties, never going beyond their scope; but at the same time, he left nothing desirable undone in seeking a better understanding between the Emperor and the Ministers of State, including the Prime Minister.

23. Advice on the conduct of state affairs is offered to the Emperor by the Ministers of State or Cabinet Ministers; advice on the conduct of Court affairs is offered to the Emperor by the Minister of the Imperial Household and advice on military operations is offered by the High Command. Advice was offered to the Emperor by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on other affairs when he was

asked by the Emperor to offer counsel to the Throne. What could be the affairs, then, on which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was called upon to offer counsel to the Emperor? He was called upon to offer counsel to His Majesty on his mental attitude. Put in other words, he was expected to offer advice to the Emperor on the question as to how to operate the various responsible organs under him as constitutional monarch. The Emperor of Japan is a constitutional monarch. Setting aside constitutional provisions, the Japanese constitutional monarchy was in fact patterned after that of England. Prince SAIONJI told me that guidance which he offered to the present Emperor was made along those lines. The Emperor, too, was intent upon observing this constitutional tradition intently. His Majesty personally visited England; while the Prince of Connaught, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Gloucester, and others paid visits to the Emperor since the Meiji era. There was a cordial exchange of courtesies between the Japanese Imperial family and the British Royal family. And the Emperor deeply appreciated the warm friendship, shown by the British Royal family and people to the Japanese Imperial family and people.

24. Marquis KIDO told me that at the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Emperor told to Prime Minister TOJO to the following effect:

"I have not yet forgotten hospitality and kindness shown to me by the English Royal family when I visited England and also warm friendship, manifested by the British people to me. It grieves me to go to war with them."

25. Mentally and politically trained as he is, the Emperor attaches importance to fixing of responsibility himself, so that in his talks with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or seeking the latter's views of counsel, His Majesty paid scrupulous care not to go beyond his official duties. I know of no instance where Marquis KIDO on his part ever went beyond the province of his official duties

as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. It may be recapitulated that Marquis KIDO offered his counsel to the Emperor on His Majesty's mental attitude or line of action prior to the commission of political action. I will refrain from referring to the theoretical aspect of the matter, as it is fully discussed by Dr. SASAKI, Soichi, Professor of the Kyoto Imperial University, in his article. For facilitating a practical understanding of the question, however, let me give an explanation with some instances.

26. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal used to have an audience with the Emperor almost every day of recent years. When Count MAKINO became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he first did not attend office every day. When some important affair occurred, he used to be summoned to the Imperial Court. Then he proceeded to the Palace to have an audience with the Emperor. Generally speaking, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was more frequently summoned to the Palace since the May 15th incident, so that later Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, nearly every day attended office and had an audience with the Emperor from the very beginning of his assumption of office as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. But those audiences were private interviews, so that the Emperor would never order a Minister of State to execute the contents of those interviews, nor would the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal advise the Emperor to execute his own private views. While I was Chief Secretary to YUASA, Kurahei, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I know from conversations with him that he sometimes submitted his own private views to the Throne for the purpose of helping the Emperor grasp the political situation both at home and abroad and so that he could understand what was submitted by a Minister of State to the Throne or mentally prepare himself for passing proper judgment. As a matter of fact, therefore, a Minister of State prior to or after his audience with the Emperor often called on YUASA, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to

explain his report to the Emperor for the purpose of amplifying it or deepening the Lord Keeper's understanding of it. But such an explanation, given by a Minister of State to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was done for his own convenience, and was not called for by any legal provisions.

27. When Marquis KIDO was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I continued as Chief Secretary and in accordance with the duties of my office I used to obtain information from various sources and report to him so that he would be advised of what was transpiring. This was necessary so that he would be well informed in the event that the Emperor asked him any questions on current matters. The following is an account of the principle events which took place while Marquis KIDO was Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

28. In June, 1941, I received information that there was a possibility that war would break out soon between Germany and Russia. At that time I had several conversations with Marquis KIDO discussing Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's intention to advocate a military expedition against Russia as well as an advance to southern regions. We were both very much disturbed about this.

29. After word was received on June 22, 1941, that Germany had commenced war against Russia, a certain section of the military commenced advocating an advance on Russia by Japan. We were all fearful that such a course would be pursued. Liaison conferences were held continuously discussing this question. Incidental to this question of a peaceful advance toward the south, I kept Marquis KIDO informed of the progress of the liaison conferences although I never attended any of these conferences. Finally, on July 2, 1941, an Imperial Conference was held. I was informed at that time that Prince KONOYE was successful in dissuading the military from proceeding against Russia and that Japan would endeavor to advance in the southern regions through diplomatic means. I informed Marquis

KIDO of the foregoing decision of the Imperial Conference. I was not informed at that time that there had been a decision in the Imperial Conference that preparations for a war with England and America would be carried forward in the event that the diplomatic relations broke down.

30. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's policy continued to be an enigma to us. I had a telephone conversation with Prince KONOYE at 1:30 o'clock in the morning of July 15. The substance of this conversation was that MATSUOKA was pursuing a policy which would interfere with the success of American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and that contrary to KONOYE's instructions the Foreign Minister had sent a cable to Ambassador NOMURA rejecting Secretary Hull's oral statement and he did not submit any compromise suggestions to Ambassador NOMURA. At 2 o'clock in the morning of July 15, TERAZAKI, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau, also telephoned me that MATSUOKA had sent the telegram. He too was perturbed that MATSUOKA had taken such a course. The next morning I reported both of these conversations to Marquis KIDO and we discussed what measures could possibly be taken with respect to Foreign Minister so that the negotiations with America could be successfully concluded. We arrived at the opinion that steps should be taken to obtain the Foreign Minister's resignation and if he did not resign the only thing left would be to have the Cabinet resign en bloc and have KONOYE form a new cabinet. Although the latter course may have an unfavorable reaction, we could see no other way out of the situation. The next day, July 16, 1941, the Cabinet resigned en bloc. I have read Marquis KIDO's statement to be presented to the Tribunal with respect to the events that transpired on September 5 and September 6, 1941. I did not know about these conferences at the time they took place but several days thereafter Marquis KIDO told me about them as

related in his aforesaid affidavit. At that time he told me that he was very much disgusted with the weak attitude which Prince KONOYE had adopted.

31. About October 13, 1941, it became apparent that the KONOYE Cabinet would collapse. From that date until formation of the TOJO Cabinet on October 17, 1941, I had a number of conversations with Marquis KIDO, the substance of all of which is as follows: There was a suggestion from various quarters that Prince HIGASHIKUNI should be the next Premier. Marquis KIDO told me and I agreed with him, that a Prince of the blood should not accept the Premiership at this time unless the military first agreed on a peaceful policy and that he should not be appointed to bring about such a situation because if he failed and the country was plunged into war the Royal Family would be blamed for it. Marquis KIDO told me that the main stumbling block in any efforts toward peace was the Imperial decision of December 6, 1941. He explained to me that it was his idea and he explained to me that the next Premier should if possible be free from that decision, and that he intended to ask the Emperor to give such a direction. He further stated that due to the adamant stand of the Army to go to war with America, that it was necessary to have a Premier who could control the Army and prevent an internal revolution when the necessary negotiations with America were finally accomplished. A third point which was bothering him was the utter lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy. The Army was bent on war and the Navy was opposed to it but would not come out and say so openly. He thought that there should be greater unity between the two of them, that is, neither of them should be unbending in their decisions towards one another. He also explained that the next Premier should be one who was thoroughly familiar with the Government's policies in all the events leading up to the decision of September 6 and the subsequent events. After having

analyzed the situation, Marquis KIDO and I then discussed who would be the best Premier under the circumstances. We both thought that it was necessary to have someone from the fighting services as no civilian would be able to control the military. We talked about General UGAKI who had been mentioned by some as a possible successor but we arrived at a conclusion that the situation was too delicate to take a chance in recommending him because of the possibility that he would be unable to form a Cabinet as had happened in the past and furthermore that his ability to control the Army was an unknown quantity as he had been in retirement for some years and his power was therefore insufficient. We also discussed the merits and demerits of Admiral OIKAWA and General TOJO. We considered the fact that OIKAWA represented the Navy which was opposed to war but we felt that if OIKAWA was appointed the chances would be that the Army would not obey him, and that it might lead to a revolution by the Army. On the other hand we thought that if TOJO was saddled with the responsibility of being Prime Minister and was ordered to disrever the decision of September 6th that he would be able to continue the negotiations with America to a successful conclusion and control the Army. On the afternoon of October 16, 1941, before KONOYE appeared at the Palace to tender his resignation, we further discussed the matter and KIDO told me that he had noticed a change in TOJO during the past few days and that he was not advocating war if the Navy was opposed to it. Marquis KIDO told me he was going to discuss the matter further with Prince KONOYE and arrive at a decision. The next morning when I saw Marquis KIDO he told me that Prince KONOYE had called him on the telephone and stated that he was in favor of recommending TOJO. The meeting of the Senior Statesmen was held that afternoon. I recall that a few days after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, told me very joyfully in his room that "TOJO is reviewing the negotiations

with America with a will." Several days later, he told me to the following effect:

"TOJO is studying the negotiation with America in dead earnest. When I asked him what should be done to control the Army in case the negotiations are successful, he assured me that he would control the Army at the risk of his own life."

32. A few days prior to November 19, 1941, Marquis KIDO told me that he had an idea which might result in making the government and the military more cautious and perhaps avoid a decision for war. His idea was to have the meeting between the Senior Statesmen and the Cabinet members at which the Senior Statesmen could express their opinions and influence the Cabinet members with their conservative opinion. Marquis KIDO made this suggestion to the Emperor on November 19, 1941. He also suggested it to TOJO who at first demurred but some days later consented to such a meeting. On November 29, 1941, members of the Cabinet met with the Senior Statesmen. Marquis KIDO was in his office all that morning and I know he did not attend the meeting. He did, however, have luncheon with the Emperor, members of the Cabinet and Senior Statesmen. After luncheon for about one hour the Senior Statesmen and TOJO met in the presence of the Emperor. Marquis KIDO attended this meeting but I understood after it was over that Marquis KIDO did not say anything at this meeting. The purpose of that meeting was for the Emperor to receive the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. After the hearing in the Imperial Presence the Cabinet members and the Senior Statesmen had a further meeting at which neither KIDO nor the Emperor attended.

33. Following the outbreak of the war, Marquis KIDO had a pessimistic outlook on the war. Once hostilities opened, it is

needless to say that he never hoped that Japan would be defeated, but he never was self-complacent as to dream of straight victories nor was he unaware of the necessity for peace as quickly as possible. It was his realistic outlook on the war that it would be impossible for Japan to win an unbroken series of one-sided victories, and it would be the possible best for Japan to restore peace when those who advocated it had attained their objective. Following the fall of Singapore, I remember him telling me that "now that the ABCD encirclement line is broken, it is time to seize the opportunity to make peace." I was also like-minded. But the least hint of the idea could not have been given at that time. Otherwise it would have been stopped. Both the Marquis and I secretly racked our brains how to attain our object, keeping our idea to ourselves.

34. After Mr. SHIGEMITSU became Foreign Minister in April, 1943, he and Marquis KIDO had many conversations in an endeavor to take the proper steps to obtain an early peace. I knew that Marquis KIDO and he were working toward this end and I too had many conventions with Mr. SHIGEMITSU. From then on, I, under secret instructions from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, kept in touch with various quarters to study the situation, both home and foreign on the one hand and on the other to seize opportunity for restoring peace between Japan and the Allies. I reported to Marquis KIDO the information I obtained and in January, 1944, the Marquis told me, "Let us secretly study a peace formula," as he was anxious to do something concrete. I had many conversations with Mr. SHIGEMITSU and so did Marquis KIDO during 1944. I kept in secret touch with suitable officials in the Foreign Office, War and Navy Ministries and Munition Ministry to make closer studies, the results of which submitted to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

35. I had an interview with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in February, 1945, when I thought that those studies reached a stage in which a conclusion should be arrived at. But no peace talk could be made openly. Otherwise, those who were party to it would be ostracized or outlawed. From the end of 1944, however, there were many politicians who secretly and yet zealously advocated peace, feeling deep concern over the future of the country. The gumbatsu, however, kept a vigilant watch over the new turn of the situation, so that the peace movement had to be conducted with meticulous care and the utmost caution. The great pains, taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in the midst of such an atmosphere were really inspiring. At that time, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal never allowed the syllable of peace talk openly to slip out of his lips, so that there were many people who earnestly advocated peace and who requested me to arrange interviews between them and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal for the avowed purpose of urging upon him the necessity for making peace with the Allies to save Japan. I tried to arrange interviews between some of them and Marquis KIDO, who, however, used to tell me:

"Even if I meet them, I know that they have the same opinions as I do. They are generally regarded by the public as peace advocates or pacifists. Should, J, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, meet them at this juncture, I would be associated with a peace movement, with which the Emperor might be also associated by the public. Our cause would be defeated, should the Emperor be won over to the opposite influence. It would do for some time, even if KIDO should be regarded as bigoted or as jingoist. Time will show. If only our country is saved, I shall be entirely satisfied."

I remember him adding to that occasion:

"Japan may now be likened to a ship entering an uncharted, narrow strait, full of sunken rock. Make just a little deviation from the right course, and she would be stranded. I must petition His Majesty to take drastic action at an opportune time."

36. I was strongly impressed that Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was inwardly troubled greatly by the peace movement with which he identified himself, and yet outwardly betrayed nothing. It was also in February, I told Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in his room to the following effect:

"This is no time for mere thinking any longer. It is time for action. Even if we take action immediately for fulfilment of the peace formula, it will take a pretty long time, situated as we are. Should it be too late, we should be prepared for death, as it would be inexcusable."

Whereupon the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied:

"Certainly. I have been long fully prepared for death. Besides, I also think it is already time for taking definite action for fulfilment of the peace formula. So you may be prepared for it."

He added:

"I have faced death twice before. First, I faced it in dealing with the aftermath of the February 26th incident and then in making endeavors for the continuation of the negotiation with America. I may face death for a third time. This time I may be possibly killed."

37. In order to have the Emperor obtain the views of the Senior Statesmen on the necessity of restoration of peace, Marquis KIDO arranged to have them appear before the Emperor individually.

He could not arrange for a meeting with all of them at one time, as the military would become suspicious. This was accomplished in February 1945. On June 9, 1945, I saw Marquis KIDO in his office before noon and he told me about his plan against the pending national crisis which existed at that time. He showed me his manuscript and I read it. It was the tentative plan for peace moves and Marquis KIDO explained it to me very enthusiastically. Marquis KIDO reported his peace move plan to the Throne in the afternoon on the same day, and his plan was approved by His Majesty, the Emperor. I knew this from my conversation with Marquis KIDO which took place soon after he had the audience with the Emperor. I also heard from Marquis KIDO that he discussed with the Premier and other ministers about his peace move plan later on.

38. I understand that Prime Minister SUZUKI and Admiral YONAI approved it in general and that War Minister ANAMI was of the opinion that the enemy should be dealt a telling blow before overtures were made for peace. It was about this time that some of the military became suspicious that Marquis KIDO was trying to bring about peace and a movement was started by them to oust Marquis KIDO as Lord Keeper. Marquis KIDO told me that he had had an audience with the Emperor regarding the proposed meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War and at that time he had advised the Emperor that the previous decision of June 8th, 1945 should not be a deterrent to peace moves. At the meeting of the Council on June 22, 1945, the Emperor communicated to the Council his desire that peace be effectuated. It was shortly after this that efforts were made to enter into peace negotiations through the mediation of the Soviet Union and have Prince KONOYE go to Moscow to make the necessary arrangements. Prince KONOYE agreed to do so but the necessary approval was never obtained from Moscow. Marquis KIDO

told me about that time that he was heartily in favor of this move and did all he could to accomplish it.

39. After the Potsdam Declaration was issued, Marquis KIDO immediately made up his mind that Japan should accept it and terminate the war. On the morning of August 9, 1945, he had an audience with the Emperor about this and after that, in accordance with directions from His Majesty, he advised the Prime Minister that steps should be taken immediately to take advantage of the Potsdam Declaration. The Prime Minister called a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War at which time they discussed the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on four conditions.

40. That afternoon the Cabinet held a meeting at which time it was unable to decide whether or not to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the one condition of preservation of the Imperial House. They decided, however, to submit the question to the Emperor for his decision. Accordingly, in the early morning of August 10, after the Imperial Conference was held in the presence of His Majesty, decision was arrived at to accept the Potsdam Declaration with this one condition. After this decision was arrived at, pursuant to his suggestion and Imperial approval, Marquis KIDO worked on the preparation of the Imperial Rescript to be delivered to the nation over the radio. Pending the reply from the Allies the situation in Japan was tense as there was a possibility that there might be a revolution. Marquis KIDO and I discussed on several occasions how we could meet any opposition pending the acceptance of the peace terms. In anticipation of trouble happening we thought up a plan of having the Emperor call not only the War and the Navy Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff but also the divisional commanders in Tokyo and Section Chiefs and order them to maintain order after making them understand fully the Imperial wishes in this respect.

Marquis KIDO so advised the Emperor and His Majesty called Admiral YONAI and General ANAMI and first discussed this with them. They said they would give the matter consideration and later Admiral YONAI reported that he would assume full responsibility for peace and order so His Majesty did nothing further about it.

41. In order to render all assistance possible to effectuate peace, Marquis KIDO, commencing about August 12, remained constantly at his office not even returning home at night. He had many conferences with various officials who were lukewarm about accepting the peace terms and I know from my conversations with him that he was vigorously advocating the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and trying to win people over to that thought. Finally, on August 14, after the Allied reply had been received, Marquis KIDO had an audience with the Emperor and advised him to command the government to accept the Allies' terms without a moment's delay as there was a possibility that the situation might get out of control. Marquis KIDO also had a conference with Prime Minister SUZUKI and they both petitioned the Emperor for an audience at which time the Prime Minister requested the convocation of an Imperial Conference which was held that evening at which time it was decided to terminate the war.

42. It was early on the morning of August 15 that a rebellion occurred in the Guard Division and an attempt was made to assassinate Marquis KIDO who, upon hearing of this, took refuge in the underground vault room in the Ministry of the Imperial Household. They were also seeking the phonograph record containing the Emperor's rescript as they wanted to destroy it. Further attempt was made by the same outfit to assassinate Marquis KIDO when they called at the home of his brother on August 16.

43. From my personal association with Marquis KIDO, both in and out of public office, and from my conversations with him and many others and from my knowledge of Marquis KIDO's acts and thoughts I know that at no time was he ever in favor of war but on the contrary he exerted his best efforts to control the militarists in Japan. In his capacity as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he was in an extremely difficult position in his constant endeavors to curb the militarists. The constant pressure of the militaristic group in obtaining political power was so great that no one person or small group of persons in Japan could possibly have prevented the war. Marquis KIDO at all times was devoting his energies trying to curb the militarists.

On this 26th day of September
1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: Yasumasa MATSUDAIRA (seal)

I, S. HOZUMI, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) S. HOZUMI (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Yasumasa MATSUDAIRA, (seal)

Def. Doc. #2503

ERRATUM SHEET

affidavit of MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

F. 27 I. 10 from bottom Detete

"which was held that evening"

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 松平康昌

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ
如ク供述致シマス

一、自分儀松平康昌は宣誓をなした上次の通り供述致します。

二、本供述書の内容は自分の知つてゐる事實及以下に述べる人々と自分が交した對話に基づいてゐます。

三、私は明治二十六年に東京で生れました。大正元年學習院を卒業し、大正八年に京都帝國大學を卒業しました。私は大學卒業後明治大學の講師となりました。大學を卒業するとすぐ明治大學で政治學及ヨーロッパを行し英國に二年間及フランスに二年間居りました。私はこの間ヨーロッパを旅政思想を晦じ、兩俊約十五年間在職しました。私はこの間ヨーロッパを旅政思想を晦じ、兩俊約十五年間在職しました。私はこの間ヨーロッパを旅政思想を晦じ、兩俊約十五年間在職しました。私はこの間ヨーロッパを旅政思想を晦じ、兩俊約十五年間

昭和十一年六月に木戸侯爵が内大臣の秘書官長の職を解した時、私は官内大臣松平恒雄に依りその後任者として選ばれました。西園寺公爵原田男爵、木戸侯爵の推薦によつて内大臣湯淺貞平の秘書官長として昭和十五年の秘書官長として昭和二十一年六月一日迄在職しました。そして昭和二十一年十一月二十四日迄木戸侯爵

五

、私は學省院に於て始めて木戸侯爵に會ひ我々二人が京都帝國大學に籍を
置いてゐた時には一層親密な間柄となりました。木戸侯爵は大正六年に
侯爵の父の爵位を繼がれ貴族院議員となりました。私が昭和五年に貴族
院議員となりました時、私と木戸侯爵との親交は一層深められました。
右の年月の間我々二人は極めて親密な間柄にありました。この様に親し
く交際してゐた爲め又一緒に仕事をした爲めに侯爵の仕事振り、才能、性
格及評判を観察する機會に非常に恵まれました。私は内大臣の秘書官長
として在職してゐた間に、内大臣府の歴史的背景及内大臣の職責を熟知す
るやうになりました。明治維新以前に於ては内大臣は公務を執つたことは
もありましたか時が経つにつれてその地位は名目だけで何も公務を執らない
やうになりました。明治維新以後に於ては政治上の改革をなした點で國
家に非常に勳功のあつた三條實美公爵は明治十八年内大臣に任命されまし
たがこの職は特に彼の爲めに復活したのでした。それは名譽職に過ぎ
ませんでした。三條公爵の死後明治二十四年に侍従長徳大寺公爵が内大
臣を兼任しました。
、今上天皇は極く若い時に攝政となられました。従つて政治上の問題
に就て攝政宮殿下を正しく補弼することが必要であると考へられました。
宮中と政府とは明確に區別しなくてはならぬといふことが明治元年の明治

六

維新以後大いに唱へられたので宮内大臣が攝政宮殿下を補弼するのは不適當であると考へられました。又國務大臣が宮中の事務を執るのも不適當でありました。何故ならさうすると宮中に於て政治をとる結果になるからでした。内大臣の職の創設を規定した法律に依ると内大臣は天皇を常侍輔弼すべきことか規定されて居りますが、それは内大臣が常に天皇の側近に侍して隨時天皇に建言するといふ意味であります。その結果内大臣は政治上の問題に就て攝政宮殿下に建言するといふこの職務を執ることが要求されました。それでこれは攝政宮殿下が天皇となられた後も行はれました。

、宮中外の問題即ち政治問題はこの頃國內的及國際的に複雑となり始めたので、天皇と内閣との間の連絡をとるためには何かが必要とせられました。かくて宮中内外の事情に鑑み、政治問題に關して内大臣が天皇に對して常時補弼する必要となりました。天皇が政治上の行動をとられる前に天皇に對して政治問題に關するこのやうな建言がなされたのですが、これは責任ある政府官吏が確定した行動をとる前に天皇が意見を述べられることが出来るやうにするためでした。併も政府が立憲政治の規定に依つて何か決定をなしたときは天皇はそれらの決定を守られ、且内大臣はそれらの決定に干渉することは禁ぜられて居りました。内大臣が所屬する官中と政府との間に明確な區別をつけるべきであるといふことが明治元年の

明治維新以來強く且絶えず要求されて來ました。その結果内大臣府に關する法律——この法律は官内省の組織を規定する法律の一部ですが——の規定によつて創設された宮内大臣の公務はこれらの線に沿つて執られました。内大臣はこれららの政府官吏に反対した行動を執つたり、又は彼等に干渉する権限はありませんでした。これらの官吏の責任は法律の規定に依つて定められ内大臣はその行動に對して法律上の責任はありませんでした。内大臣は天皇によつて任命されるので純然たる宮中の官吏であつて天皇に對してだけ責任がありました。

七八、當時補弼の外、内大臣は御璽及國璽を保管する義務を負ひました。文書が内大臣府に送付された時若し公式例に規定されてゐる條件がすべて具備され且天皇が教可を下されたならば、内大臣は御璽又は國璽を當該文書に押すことを拒絶することは出来ませんでした。内大臣は文書の内容に就て批判する権限はありませんでしたか、たゞ御璽又は國璽を押す條件を當該文書が法律上具備してゐるかどうかを懲討する権限だけを付與されて居りました。過去二十年間に於ける状勢の變化により内閣更迭の場合、新首相を奏薦するといふ新しい任務が内大臣に附託せられました。これは來内大臣の任事では

私は次の様な沿革を西園寺公牧野伯湯浅倉平氏、木戸侯、原田男、其他の人々から聽きました。
その内閣更迭の場合にも天皇は後^相に就て先づ元老に御下問遊ばされて居りました。元老は明治維新並に其後の政治革新に自ら参加し國家に顯功のあつた人で元老として殊遇を蒙る旨^勅語のあつた人々に限られて居りました。最初のうちは元老は數人ありましたがが時と共に相踵いで順次薨去致しました。漸うして生じた空席は上述の様な元老の定義より補充することが出来ませんでした。
最後に西園寺公爵が唯一存命せる元老となりました。
西園寺公爵は高齢になつてから興津に住んで居りました。御下問の際後^相に就て御下問に沿するの榮譽を御譲^申上げました。そこで陛下は後^相に就て内大臣に御下問になつたのであります。が、時の内大臣牧野伯爵は西園寺公爵は猶ほ内外の情勢を判断する聰明さを持つて居らるゝことでありますから後^相に就ては元老に御下問可然旨を奉答したのであります。
内大臣の奉答に随つて天皇は後^相に就て元老西園寺公に御下問になりました。

元老西園寺公爵は上京が困難になつて來たとの理由で既に後継首相に就て天皇より御下問易ぐる業書を提出して居りましたので最初は侍従長が彼には内大臣が勅旨を奉戴して元老に尋ねたのであります。元老の所見を求めてより歸京してこれを奏上致しました。

内大臣が何か餘儀ない事情で奥津に行かれぬ時は秘書官長が内大臣の代りに元老を訪問しました。此の慣習は牧野伯爵の時より湯浅氏の内大臣在任中の中頃迄はありましたが、元老西園寺公爵は更に高齢に達したるのみならず久しきに亘る異常生活は現書の情勢に迷途となつて書面申上ぐるに自信を失つたとの理由で御下問に尋答申上ぐる責任を御免除めりたき旨天皇に奉請致しました。陛下には長くも公の奏請を諒せられそのため近衛公爵が第一次近衛内閣の譲渡と共に公の譲表を御呈しました。内大臣をして其の判斷に完璧を期し且つ又内大臣を補導する爲め天皇は後継首相に就て内大臣に御下問めらせらるゝに當り元老に詰りたる後奉答するやう御附言遊ばされました。此の慣習はそれから元老が薨去せらるゝまで繼續致しました、其の結果時の内大臣湯浅倉平氏は判斷の萬全を期する爲め先づ前總理大臣と権密院議長とを個別に訪問して意見を交換し、それから元老の評に參りました。

元老と誂つてから湯淺氏は自己の責任を以つて奉答致したのであります。原田男爵も木戸侯爵も内大臣が重臣の助言を求めてから奏請するといふ考へは西園寺公より出たものでありますと申して居りました。若し御下間に奉答した結果が悪い場合にも内大臣はこれに對し責任はあります。何故なれば總理大臣の行為の責任は總理大臣が其の任に就いた時に採り、又總理大臣は憲法の定むるところに隨ひ、法律上自己の國務遂行上の行為に責任を負ふものであるといふことは慣習上一般に了承せられて居つたところであります。

内大臣の責任は奉答をなし陛下がこれをお受けになつた際國消滅致しました。若し内大臣が御下間に奉答の結果御信任を失つた時は、それは後に不幸にして事實となつて現はれましたが内大臣はもう其の任に留まるのを許されないのであります。斯の如く内大臣は天皇に對してのみ責任を負ふのであります。

十六本戸侯爵が昭和十五年六月一日内大臣となつた以前にも侯爵と私と内閣更迭の際總理大臣奉薦に伴ふ方法に就て改良の方策を討議しあつたことであります。私は昭和十五年六月、私は重臣官議を開いて其の意見を聽く方が内大臣が個々に重臣に意見して意見を徵する方法よりは良いといふことに意見の一致したことを覚えて居ります。

其時侯爵は此の方法は政情不安に導く憶測・風聞・申傷を除く手が出来るだらう。内大臣が前は源内大臣に日々に面會すれば乙等の憶測・風聞中傷の結果内大臣が政治に導はると云はれる危險をかもす事になると申し私は之に同感でありました。其の上旨説に於て意見を聽取することにより總ての事情を客観的には討することが出来、又重臣もお互ひの意見により得失する事が出来るのであります。私共兩人は更に内大臣の意見は悉く内大臣の舉薦と共に奏上しなければならぬと考へました。これは木戸侯爵が内大臣に決を採つて決を採つてはならないが重臣全部の意見は悉く内大臣の舉薦と共に奏上しなければならぬと考へました。これは木戸侯爵が内大臣に決を採つた時採つた方法であります。そしてこれは一度木戸侯爵が内大臣で西園寺公爵が存命中内閣の更迭が決つた時の事ですが私は最初に首相に就て西園寺公爵の進舉と意見とを申受けたこれを木戸侯爵に報告したことがありました、これは昭和十五年七月未内閣が解散し第十二次近衛内閣の出来る時のことでありました。

十二何故訴首相奏薦の手續を採る必要があつたかそれは採問の余地のないところでありますがその理由を了解するには木戸侯爵以前に於ける内大臣の困難、苦難を知る必要があります。

近年の日本に於ける政治的耽撫は自由主義者と国家主義者と自由主義者と国家主義者は獨善的獨尊的国家の論争を行しました。軍國主義者即ち國家主義者は獨善的獨尊的国家

として、自由主義者即ち國際主義者は國際的日本として之を文記する事を目標と致しました。單國主義的國家主義者の間には二勢力があり互に他を排除し政府の支配力を獲得しやうとしました。私がよく存じ上げて居りました西園寺公爵は自由主義者の指導者でありました。多くの機會に公は國際平和を維持する事及び日本政府が該格に尊崇した行動をなす必要がある事を私に話しました。公は多くの場合天皇陛下に該格に此の觀念に立脚した所信を奏上し、陛下も直ちに公の建言をお聞き邊はされ公の政治的見解を御了解邊はされたと云ふ事を知つて居ります。

十三

西園寺公爵の信任厚く又公と親交のあつたグループは牧野伯爵を始めとして内大臣として牧野伯を後繼した湯淺倉平氏もこのグループの人であります。西園寺公は次代の人である近衛公暨木戸侯を信任し、その指導に勞を惜しみませんでした。私はこの事實を立等の人々との接觸、對話及び公の秘密であつた原田男爵より聞いて知つて居ります。平和的國際關係及び一般國家政策としての國際主義を提唱し、立等一般國家政策實現の爲の確固たる手段として西歐親善政策をとつた是等すべての人々はその政策に反対する陸軍より常に排斥されて居りました。故に彼等は五、一五又は、二、二六等種々の事件に對する暗殺の危険に曝きました。牧野伯に對する暗殺は幾度も試みられました。彼の後繼者として内大臣を拜命した齋藤子爵は暗殺者の狂刃の犠牲となり斃れたのであります。齋藤子爵を後繼し終りました。木戸侯殺害陰謀も昭和十一年二月二十六日、昭和十五年七月五日、昭和二十年八月十五日、六日と三回に亘つて計畫されました。生命に對する陰謀と同じく立等の人々に對する中傷的宣傳は此處に列舉のいゝとまない種の多きに上つて居ります、又それに對しては廣く知られて居ります。

す故特に概述する必要もないと思ひます。今述べた西園寺公と極く親しかつた人々の他に公の友人見做され、公と同じ政治所信を有してゐた人々は暗殺されたり、その危険に曝されたりしました、顯著な例として殺害された高野是清子爵と襲撃をつけた岡田海軍大將があります

十四天皇は元老西園寺公と共に御意見であらせられました、軍部及び権右派が着々と政界を蚕食してゐた事實に鑑み唯一の存命中の元老西園寺公は内大臣を軍部その他の支持する獨裁主義に對する障壁或は援護物として活動せしめ上つてしましました此事により公が内大臣を撰ぶに當つて細心の注意を用ひた事は明白であります。代々の内大臣はすべてこの特定の目的の爲に彼に上り選ばれたのです、私が西園寺公にあ會ひした時私はまづ直接に彼からこの事を聞きました。こればかりでなく牧野、齋藤、湯淺、木戸を含む代々の内大臣は我が國が政治的不安に悩まされ始めて以來所謂青年士官及び権右派の攻撃的と云つた事は事實に上り明かであります

僕私が西園寺公、牧野伯豊び他の人達と次々に話した談話上り判断するに、木戸侯は當時の内大臣牧野伯の最も有能なる秘書官長として信頼されて居りそして侯はこの政界に沿つてその上司を強力に輔佐した事は明かであります

貴時侯は西園寺公の個人秘書原田男や近衛公と密接な連絡を保つて政治情勢を研究して居りました。私は貴族院議員であつたので属々内大臣秘書官長木戸侯、原田男、近衛公と會ひ意見の交換をした事を思ひ出します十五後に日本の走勢に重大な影響を與へた軍部及親右派一部の活動が政界で最初に目立ち出したのは一九三一年の三月事件と滿洲事變の間であります

私は木戸侯爵が數年後にこの事について次の様に語つたことを思ひ出します。即ち私が内大臣牧野伯爵の秘書官長になつた時三月事件滿洲事變等の大事件が私の在任六ヶ月の間に次々と矢繼ぎ早に發生しました。三月事件は失敗に歸しました。併し我々はその事件を非常に重視しました、といふのはそれは国内改革を實行する爲に政界に乗り出すに當つての軍部の企圖の前兆であつたからであります。

我々はそれを頗る重大事件と考へました。それ故に私は我々の方面でこれを止め又政治を常道に置くべくこの事につき近衛公、西園寺公の個人秘書原田男その他の人々と面談しました、西園寺公の指掌の下に私は、一方時局に反對の立場を探りながら極端に走らないやつに軍部を指導することに上つてこれを遂行する爲めかりでなく政黨政治家達の政治力を弱化する爲即ち立憲政治の完全な構造を保證する爲に近衛公その他の人々と共に一生

懸命骨折つたのです。併しながら續けざまに發生した事件又事件は速に軍の勢力を増大し、その結果甚だ遺憾ながら我々の最初の計画を遂行することが出来ないのでした

十六、二六事件の時、木戸侯は内大臣秘書官長として在職してゐました。時の内大臣齋藤子爵は暗殺され當時の總理大臣關田大將は矢張り最初は命令を共にしたと考へられました。この結果木戸侯は大御心に咎びこれ以上の災害を避ける爲非常なる努力をせねばならなかつたのです。この事件の結果當時宮内大臣湯浅倉平氏は内大臣に任せられました。これにより新宮内大臣の選任が必要となりました。松平恒雄氏が一九三六年に宮内大臣に選ばれた直後の如き要旨を木戸侯は私に話しました

松本恒雄氏を後任宮内大臣として天皇陛下に内奏申上げ同氏にこの申出を受諾されるやうに促したのは私でした。私は少くとも皇室を軍部勢力の潜入から防ぎたいと云ふ熱望に駆られてゐたのです。

十七、松平恒雄氏は日本大使として在任してゐた英領より歸朝したばかりでした。同氏は在アメリカ全權公使であつたし親英米派首領者として軍部より焼印を押されてゐました。軍部の脅迫の確中にあつて宮内大臣として陛下に彼を内定した木戸侯の眞の勇氣は高く評價さるべきであります。私は後に左

つて近衛公や原田男と話しあつた時、これが「々話題に上つた事を思ひ出します。彼等は二人とも宮内大臣として公平恒雄氏を陛下に内奏した不戸候の立派な終焉ある様の勇氣を賞讃しました。

十八私が内大臣湯浅倉平の秘書官長となつた後木戸候は宮内省の宗秩寮總務に参りました。第一次近衛内閣組閣後数ヶ月経た一九三七年十月候は辭任した佐井氏の後任として内閣に入り文部大臣となりました候との過去の關係に據つて私はこの内閣についての情報を蒐集する爲候と連絡をとつてゐました候は支那事變の徐々擴大するのを少なからず憂慮して度々私に出来る旨話しました。候が文部大臣の職に勤められた時に候は私に幾時内閣に参加することを好まないと語りました。併し候は近衛公の候に對する關員として中國との平和回復に努力する上、切なる要求を容れ内閣に参加することに決めました。近衛公もまた私に同様のことを話しました

一九、木戸侯は一九三九年（昭和十四年）の平沼内閣に内務大臣として参加しました。この内閣は三国防共協定強化の問題に非常に悩まされ絶えずその互解を傳えられました。當時私は木戸侯と緊密な接觸を保つてゐました。併し侯はこの問題討議の五大臣會議の參與員でなかつたので同問題の内容をよく知らずそのため私も侯よりあまり情報を聞くことが出来ませんでした。五大臣會議は數十回開催せるも何等決論を見るに至りませんでした。その間陸軍は焦燥のあまり三国防共協定強化に一般人民の人心を煽らんと外部工作を始めました。その不可避的結果として治安維持の見地より容易ならざる事態の発生を見ました。これがため木戸侯は内務大臣として非常に憂慮していました。私は今でも思ひ出します。侯はこの問題は非常に慎重に扱はなければならぬと考へました。それはこの問題のため内閣が互解すれば陸軍海軍間の対立は表面化し、國民を不安に陥らしめることになるからであります。また長老政治家及他の首脳者達が暴力行為に上り全滅するようになりますが侯はこの問題に真剣な考慮を拂つてゐました。反英反米支配となる恐れが多分にあつたからであります私は今も思ひ存れるのであります。木戸侯はこの問題に真剣な考慮を拂つてゐました。反英反米の騒動がその頃起つた時、侯は内務大臣の資格で内務省に於て警視

總監及營保局長等に命令指示を與へこれを取扱りました。併し侯の取つた手段は親英親米派のみならず極端主義者及陸軍に反対の人々により批難されました。併し侯の眞意は以上述べた處により明瞭であります。兩派共侯を攻撃し一派は侯はあまりに寛大であるといへ、他はあまりに厳酷であるといひました。私は井上三郎侯から聞いたのですが同侯が一九三八年に（昭和十三年）文化使節として獨逸を訪問した時獨逸の外務大臣フォンリッペントロップは同侯との會見の際木戸侯が日本に於ける主なる親英親米政治家の一人なる旨述べたといふ事であります。

二〇、一九四〇年（昭和十五年）に湯淺氏が病氣の爲内大臣を辭職した時木戸侯は後繼者として内大臣に任せられました。木戸侯の任命前當時宮内大臣たりし松平恒雄氏は後繼内大臣を陛下に推薦する責任があるので私を招致して内大臣後繼者の問題につき意見を尋ねました。故私は西園寺公の西園寺公の意見も聽取するやう私に命じました。氏は又元老個人的秘書官なる原田男と數回東京でこの問題について會議しました。私は宮内大臣松平氏にその旨報告しました。私は宮内大臣松平氏より聞いたのであります。同氏は病臥中の辭任内大臣湯淺倉平氏及近衛公の意見をも尋ねましたが皆木戸侯を後繼内大臣として推薦したことであ

りました。私は木戸侯の内大臣就任を後援した軍部の百職者があつたことは聞きません。私はまた被告のうち誰も侯を後援し又は侯の就任運動に積極的に參與した者があつたことを聞きません。

二一、日本獨逸及伊太利國に三國同盟條約締結問題が第二次近衛内閣の下に起つた時木戸侯はそれは結局日米間の衝突を招來する恐れありとし私にも數回その旨語りました。木戸侯はこの間につき總理大臣近衛及外務大臣松岡と會談したといひました。そして一度私に總理大臣及外務大臣の兩者共この同盟は米國との戦争を回避する目的であるといふ音見であります。が自分には了解出来なかつたと語りました。私は侯が私に失望してかく語つたことを思ひ出します。

二二、常に陛下に近侍し陛下に「常時輔弼」即ち絶えず萬見を委上する侯の公的任務に忠實なる上から木戸侯は國務大臣の上奏事項について萬見をして次のやうに述べられました。併し私との會談で侯は個人的旨の等句にも拘らず實際政治により判断すると世界平和促進に逆行しました米英との戦争を招來する恐れがあると、こと斯くの如きに至らば日本にとり由々しきこと、なる旨侯は私によく話しました。侯は自己の公的任務にどこまでも忠實でその限外に逸脱することはあります。併し同時に陛下と總理大臣外務大臣の了解を促す

ためにはあらゆる望ましき手段を講ぜずには惜かなかつたのであります

二三、政務の執行にしては國務大臣又は閣僚から天皇に意見が奏上されました。宮廷内の事務執行にしては宮内大臣から意見を天皇に奏上し軍の作戦にしては総帥部から意見を申し上げました。其他の事にして天皇から御質問のあつた場合は内大臣が天皇に意見を奏上しました。然らば一体如何なる事に關して内大臣が天皇に意見を申し上げる筈であつたか。彼はその精神状態に就て意見を陛下に申し上げる筈でありました。換云すれば立憲國主權者としてその下にある種々の責任ある機關の運営方に關する問題に對し彼の意見を天皇に奏上する筈でありました。日本の天皇は立憲國主權者でありまつた。憲法の條項は雷く惜き日本の立憲君主政体は事實英國の政体に取つたものであります。西園寺公が今上天皇に對する御指導は其方針に従つてやつたものであると公は語りました。天皇陛下も亦立憲國の儀式を専ら御遵守になりました。天皇は親しく英國を御訪問になりました。明治時代以來コンノート殿下英國皇室殿下グロスター公其の他の方々が天皇陛下を御訪問になりました。日本皇室と英國皇室との間には懇篤な禮儀が交換されました。また天皇は英

御皇室及び英國民が日本の皇室及日本國民に示した厚き反情を極だ御喜びになりました。

二四、太平洋戦争勃發當時天皇陛下が次の意味の事を東條首相に御話しましたと木戸侯は私に語りました。

「私が英國を訪問した時英國の皇室が示した厚意切及び其の人の示した反情を今でも忘れない英國と戦争をする事は私の悲しみに堪えぬ所である」

二五、精神的に又政治的に敏捲ある陛下は御身で責任を定める事を重要と御感にになられて居ります。従つて内大臣との御會談に於ても又内大臣の意見を御求めになるにも陛下は公務以外に直らぬやう周到な御注意を御拂ひになりました。木戸侯はかつて内大臣としての公務範圍以外に立ち入った例を私は知りません。要約すれば陛下が政事に関する行為を果される前に陛下の御氣持又は御方針を御きめになる参考に不戸侯は自分文に充分論じられて居た故私はこの問題の理論的方面に云及する事は遠慮します。然し問題を實際上分り易くする為の例を擧げて説明致します。

二六、近年内大臣は殆ど毎日陛下に拜謁する例になつて居りました。牧野伯が内大臣になつた當初は毎日は出勤しませんでした。何か重要問題が起きた時宮中に召されるのが慣例でありました。それから彼は拜謁の爲め参内しました。大体五、一五事件以來内大臣は頻繁に召されるやうになりました。其後湯浅倉平氏は彼が内大臣に就任した其初めから毎日出勤しました。天皇陛下に拜謁しました。然しその拜謁は私的の會見でありました。それ故天皇は其私の會談中の事を實行にうつすやう國務大臣に御命令なさる御考もなく又内大臣もその個人的意見を實施するやう御忠言は申し上げませんでした。私が内大臣湯浅倉平の秘書官長を勤めて居つた當時同大臣が時に陛下に内外の政治状勢御理解の一助となるやう内大臣自身私的意見を申し上げそれによつて陛下が國務大臣の奏上する事を御諒解になりました。又適當な判断を御下しになる事が出来る様な御心への準備して差上國務大臣は彼の報告を詳述し又は内大臣の理解を深めんとする目的で陛下への報告を説明する爲拜謁に先立ち又はその後に湯浅内大臣を屢々訪問しました。然し内大臣に對する國務大臣のかゝる説明は彼自身の都合でやつた事で法律上の規定による義務ではありませんでした。

二七、木戸侯が内大臣に就任した時私は秘書官長として勤務を繼續しました職務上私は各方面から情報を得てそれによつて大臣は何が起りつづかるか情報を知り得るやうそれを大臣に報告するのが例でありました。陛下が現在進行中の事柄に就いて大臣に質問になる場合大臣がよく其事に

ついて心得ておかれはならぬ爲め此事は心要でありました。次に述べるものは木戸侯が内大臣であつた富時起つた主なる事柄の顛末であります。一九四一年六月、近い中に獨ソ間に戦争が起る可能性があると云ふ情報をおは待ました。其時私は松岡外相が南方進出と同様に露西亞遠征を唱へる意向を寺つて居る事に就て木戸侯と種々話しあひました。私共は

此件に就て二ノ井不^レを^レ、
二九、一九四一年六月二十二日通知を受取つてから——その時は獨乙は既に對露戰爭を開始して居ましたが、陸軍の一部では此の際日本がロシヤに進撃することを提唱し始めました。我々は此の様な方針が進められるのではないかと危惧に堪へませんでした。連絡會議が連續的に行はれこの問題が討議されました。南部平和進駐のこの問題に附隨して、私は之等會議には全然出席致しませんでしたが、木戸侯には連絡會議の經過を常に報告してゐました。一九四一年七月一日遂に御前會議が開かれました。その際私は近衛公が陸軍に對露戰を思ひ止まらせることに成功した事及び日本は外交手段を用ひて南方地域に進駐せんと努力するであらうとの報告を受けました。そこで私は木戸侯に御前會議に於ける前述の決議を報告しました。私はその時御前會議に於て外交關係が失敗に歸した時に備へて英國及び米國に對する戰爭準備は着々進められるであらうと云ふ決議があつた旨の報告は受けて居りませんでした。私は七月十五日午前一時三十分近衛公と電話に依り談話を交はしました。この談話の要旨は松岡は日米外交交渉の目的達成を防げる方針を進めてゐる。而も

近衛の命令に違反して外務大臣は野村大使に對してハル長官の口頭聟助を拒否するとの電報を發ししかも之に代る妥協案を野村大使に示唆することをしなかつたと云ふのであります。又七月十五日午前二時アメリカ局長寺崎も電話で松岡が電報を發したと報告して参りました。寺崎も同様松岡が斯かる方針を取つた事に對し憂慮して居りました。翌朝私は木戸侯に此の兩方の談話を傳へ我々は米國との交渉を成功させる爲に外務大臣に對しどういふ手段を探つたらいゝかといふ事に就いて討議致しました。我々は外務大臣を辭職させるか若し彼が辭職しない場合は最後策として内閣總辭職を決行し近衛か新内閣を組織すると云ふ處置を探るべきであると意見の一一致を見ました。勿論後者の方には不利な反動が伴ふかも知れませんでした。この状態ではその以外の方法は考へられませんでした。一九四一年七月十六日内閣は總辭職を致しました。私は法廷に提出されて居ります一九四一年九月五日及び九月六日に起つた事件に關する木戸侯の陳述を讀みましたが當時此等の會議に就ては全然存じません。只數日後、木戸侯が今申し上げました彼の宣誓口述書中に述べてあります通りそれ等の事に就いて私に詰られたのでありますその際彼は近衛公が探つてゐると述べました。翌一

三、

一九四一年十月十三日頃、近衛内閣が崩壊する事は明白となつて参りました。その日より一九四一年十月十七日東條内閣の成立まで私は木戸侯と幾回となく談話ヲ交はしました。その要旨は次の通りであります。各方面より東久邇宮を次の總理大臣にすべきであるとの提案がありました。木戸侯は次の如く述べ私もそれに同意致しました。即ち官家は此の際陸軍が先づ平和政策に同意するのでなければ總理大臣の職を受理すべきではなく、又かゝる状態に至らしめる即ち陸軍に平和政策を同意させる爲に東久邇宮が任命さるべきではない。何故ならば木戸侯は平和に對しての如何なる努力にも常に躊躇となると皇室が其の爲に非難を蒙る事になるからであると云ふのであります。木戸侯は彼自身の意見であると説明し、又次の總理大臣は出來得ればこの決定に束縛されない自由の人でなければならぬ。で自分は天皇にこのやうな指圖をお與へ下さる様お願ひする心算であると説明しました。彼は之更に彼は陸軍が米國と一戦を交へやうとする堅き決心を持つてゐるのであるから陸軍を抑制し、又米國との必要な交渉が決定的に成立した。もう一つ木戸侯が頭を悩ましてゐたことは、陸海軍が全く協力

を缺いて居たことでありました。陸軍は開戦論であり、海軍は之に反対でありました。尤も海軍は口に出して公然と反対は致しませんではいた。木戸侯は陸海軍がもつと協力一致しなくてはならぬ。陸海軍は互ひにその考を突張り合つてみてはならぬと考へてゐました。又木戸侯は後継内閣の首班は九月六日の決議になで至らしめた諸問題並にその後の問題に就ての政府の政策に精通したものでなくてはならぬと云ふことをかつて居りました。當時の状勢に就いての検討を了てから木戸侯と私は話し合つたのですが私等兩人の考は、文官の者では軍部を抑えることは出來ないのでは矢張り軍部から選ばなくてはならないと云ふことは出來ないのでは矢張り軍部から選ばなくてはならないと云うのであります。宇垣大將の話も出ました。宇垣大將はゐる人達から後継内閣首班に推されてゐたのであります。宇垣大將は、文官の者では軍部を抑えることは出來ないのでは矢張り軍部から選ばなくてはならないと云うのであります。宇垣大將を推するは冒險過る、その理由は宇垣大將は重大であつて宇垣大將を推するは冒險過る、その理由は宇垣大將は組織に失敗したように今度も組織が出来ない公算がありまた大將は隠棲數年にも及んでゐるから大將が軍を抑える力は未知数である、結局その力は十分でないのではないかと云ふのでありました。それから及川大將と東洋將軍の長老を論じました。私共の考では及川大將は開戦論に反対の海軍を代表する者であるが及川大將に大命が下れば陸軍が及川大將に従うまいし、やがては陸軍が革命を惹起するかも知れない」と

云うのでありました。他面には、もし東條將軍が首相としての責務を課せられ且九月六日の決議に囚われずにやる様に命ぜられるならば、アメリカとの交渉も繼續してうまくやれようし、又軍を抑えることも出来ようと考えました。昭和十六年十月十六日午後、近衛首相が辭表を提出する爲に参内する以前にも我々はそのことに就いて尙議論致しました。そして木戸侯は私に「東條はこの数日の間に考を變えたように思われる。海軍が開戦に反対なら東條は開戦論を唱えることはない」と申します。木戸侯はまたこのことに就いては尙近衛公とも話合つてから決めようと私に申しました。翌朝、私が木戸侯に會つた折私に「近衛公から電話があつて、近衛公も東條を推すと云はれた」と申しました。眞理會議はその日の午後開かれました。東條内閣が出来てから、數日後木戸内閣は自室で「東條は本氣でアメリカとの交渉を再吟味して居る」と喜んで話したのを覚えてゐます。そしてまた數日後には私に次のような話がありました。「東條はアメリカとの交渉を行つた場合には、どう云ふ風にして軍を抑えるのだと尋ねたら東條は自己の一命を賭して軍を抑えようと確言した。」と云うのであります。昭和十六年十一月十九日より數日以前木戸侯は私に向つて「政府並に軍部をして更に慎重ならしめ、或は開戦の決意をやめさせられるかも

知れないと思はれる工夫があるのだが」と云いましたが木戸侯の考は、重臣と閣僚と會議を開くことでありその會議に於て重臣達はその考を述べその保守的な意見を以て閣僚達を動すことが出来ようと云うのでありました。木戸侯は昭和十六年十一月十九日、天皇陛下にこの事を申上げたのであります。それからまた東條首相にもこの事を話しました。東條首相は最初これに異議を申しましたが數日後、そう云う會議を開くことを承諾致しました。昭和十六年十一月二十九日、閣僚と重臣との會議が開かれました。木戸侯はその日の午前中、自室に居りました。私は木戸侯がその會議には列席しなかつたことを存じて居りました。然し陛下並に閣僚重臣達の午餐の時には、席致して居りました。午餐後、重臣達と東條とは約一時間御前で會合致しました。木戸侯はこの會合には出席致しました。尤も木戸侯はこの席上では何も申さなかつたと云うことをその會合の後に承知致しました。この時の會合は陛下が重臣達の意見を御聽取になる爲のものでありました。陛下がこの意見を御聽取になつた後閣僚と重臣とは會議を續行致しました。開戦後、木戸侯は戦争の前途を危んで居りました。侯は勿論一度開戦となれば日本が敗れることは思ひませんでした。日本が一氣に勝つことがあると夢見る様な獨りよがりでなく、また出来るだけ早く媾和する必要であることに気がつかなかつたわけではありませんでした。

した。木戸侯のこの戦争に對する現實的な見透しは、日本が一方的勝利を以て勝抜くなど、云うことは不可能なことであつて、日本にとつて最もよいのは、出來れば戦争論者がこの目的を達した時に於て媾和をすることであると云うのであります。一應その目的であるから今こそ媾和の好機をとらえるべき時である」と申したのを記憶致して居ります。

私もそう云う考へを持つて居ました。然し當時はそう云う考をいささかも匂はすことが出来ませんでした。もし云出せばそれは中止せしめられたでしよう。木戸侯も私もこの考を内密にして置いて、その目的を達する爲に秘かに頭を悩まして居ました。

昭和十八年四月に重光氏が外務大臣に就任後、同氏と木戸侯とは早期和平を実現するため適宜の手段を講ぜんとして度々会談しました。私は木戸侯と重光氏がこの目的のため奔走してゐることを知つて自分でも又重光氏と度々会談したのであります。

爾來私は内大臣の内命を受けて内外の情勢を研究すると共に他方日本と聯合國との間に平和回復の機會を捉へるために種々の方面と連絡を保つて居りました。私は入手した情報を木戸侯に報告して居ましたが昭和十九年一月に侯爵は「和平の方式を内密に研究しよう」と私に云はれました。何か具体的な手を打ちたいと考へられたからであります。その年のうちに私は重光氏と度々会合し、又木戸侯も同氏と会談されました。私は一層綿密な研究を行ふために、外務省、陸海軍省及び軍需省の適宜の文武官と秘密に連絡してその研究の成果を逐一内大臣の許に提出してゐたのであります。

昭和二十年二月私は内大臣と會見しましたがその際之等の研究が漸く或る結論を得る所まで到達したと考へました。しかし和平を公然と口にする観目にあふかであります。然るに昭和十九年の暮頃から國家の將來を深く憂へて秘密にではあつたがしかし熱心に和平を唱へた政治家も多くありました。しかしながらさうした新しい情勢の變化に對しては絶え

ず軍閥の監視の眼が光つてゐたので和平運動は細心の注意と此上ない慎重さを以て行はれなければなりませんでした。かゝる雰囲氣の唯中で、内大臣の嘗められた辛苦のほどは誠に懦夫をして起たしめるものがありました。

當時内大臣は和議の語を公然口に上せられることは決してなかつたので熱心な和平の唱道者の中には日本を救ふためには、此際聯合國と媾和することが必要であることを公然侯に勧告するため内大臣との會見を斡旋するやうに私に依頼し來た人が歸山あつたのであります。私はその中の或る人々と木戸侯との會見を斡旋しようとしたこともあります。私はその中は之に對して毎度私にかう云はれたのであります。

「あの人達と會つて見たところで私と同意見だといふことはもう判つてゐる。彼等は大体媾和論者又は平和主義者と世間から認められてゐる。此の際内大臣たる私が彼等と會見すれば、私は和平運動に關係することとなり、ひいては天皇も之に關係あるやうに世間から見られぬとも限らない。万一天皇が反對派に與せられるやうなことになれば我々の運動は挫折するだらう。假令木戸は頑固者又は强硬論者だと目されようとこゝ暫くは構はない。時が刻てば判るだらう。祖國さへ救はれるならば私はそれで十分満足なのだ」

その際侯が次のやうに附云されたのを覚えてゐます。

「日本は今地圖にもない、狭い暗礁の多い水路に入つてゆく一般の舟になぞらへられよう。正しい道路をほんの一寸でも外れたら最後、暗礁に乗り上げてしまふ。私は適當の時機に抜本的措置を執られるやうに陛下に御願しなければならない」内大臣木戸侯が志を同うする和平運動のために内心いたく苦慮せられながらも、何一つ外に表はされない態度に私は強い感銘を受けました。

同じ二月に私は内大臣木戸侯にその居室に於て左のやうに進言したのであります。

「一もはや唯考へて居る時機ではありません。正に起つべき時です。今直に我々が和平方式實現のため起つとしても、現在の情況ではかなり長い時間を要するでせう。万一時機を失するやうな場合には、當然死を覺悟しなければなりません。その時はもはやどんな言譯も立たないのでありますから」

そこで内大臣はかう答へられました。

「宜しい。私はもうずっと前から死ぬ覺悟は出來てゐる。その上、私は又今こそ和平方式を實行するためには斷乎として起つべき時だと考へる。だから君もその覺悟をしてもらひたい」

更にかう附云されました。

今まで私は死に直面したことが二度あつた。最初は例の二・二六事件の

結果を處理した時で次は、對米交渉最終のために盡力した時だ、これで丁度三度目だが今度こそ或は人の手にかゝつて死めかもしれない」平和回復の必要に關する重臣の意見を陛下に聽いていたぐために、木戸侯は重臣達を一人々々伺候させるやうに計らひました。但軍閥に怪まれないとも限らないので、同時に重臣全部を謁見せられるやうには計ふことが出来ませんでした。

これが遂行されたのは昭和二十年二月のことであります。

同じ年の六月九日の午前に私は木戸侯をその官舎に訪れましたが侯は當時差迫つた國難に對する侯の對案について話されました。侯はその草稿を示されたので、私はそれは讀みました。それは和平工作の試案で木戸侯は之を實に熱心に私に説明されました。木戸侯は同日午後にこの和平工作試案を上奏され陛下の御親裁を受けられました。この事は侯が陛下に謁見された直ぐ後で侯と會見して判つたのであります。

又木戸侯が後に首相其他の閣僚と和平工作の試案について論議を交はされたことも侯から聞きました。

私は鈴木首相と米内大將は大體に於て之に賛成であり、阿南陸相は和平申込をする前に敵に一大痛撃を加ふべきふ謀見を有つて居つたと了解いたします。軍の一部が木戸侯は和平招來を企圖してゐるとの疑を抱き侯を内大臣の地位から逐ふ運動を開始したのはこの頃の事でありました。木戸侯は侯が開催豫定になつてゐた戦争指導最高會議に關して天皇陛下に拜謁仰付けられたこと及びその際、先の一九四五年六月八日の決定に拘泥して和平措置を諱ずるに答かであつてはならないと奏上した旨、私に語りました。一九四五年六月二十二日の同會議席上、陛下は和平達成成員を念願として居らるる旨を御洩し遊ばされました。その後纏なく、ソ聯を介する和平交渉を開始し且つ之に對する必要の決定を行ふべく近衛公をモスコイへ派遣するやう努力が爲されました。近衛公はこのモスコイ行に賛成したのであります。が肝にんのモスコイは遂に賛成しませんでした。木戸侯は自分はこの方策に衷心賛成し之が達成の爲に出来るだけの努力をしたとその當時私に語られました。

ボツダム宣言發表後、直ぐ木戸侯は日本はこの宣言を受諾し、戦争を終結すべきであると快心しました。一九四五年八月九日朝、侯はこの間日に關し陛下に拜謁し、その後陛下の御指圖にしたがひ首相に對して直ちにボツダム宣言にうまく乗ずるやうな措置を採るべきことを勧告しました。首相

は皇室指導最高會議を開催、並に於て四つの條件をもつてボツダム宣言を受諾することが討議されたのであります。

當日の午後閣議を開きましたが、この閣議では皇室保存といふ一條件をつけてボツダム宣言を受諾するか、せぬか決定することが出来ませんでした。併しこの問題につきましては陛下の御意旨を仰ぐことに閣議が一決いたしました。それ故に八月十日早朝陛下御臨席の上(御前會議を開き、この件で不戸侯は、木戸侯自身の提案と、それに對する陛下の御意旨によりラジオを通じて國民に放送さるべき勅書の作成に取組りました。この決定の内近勢は不安を孕んで居りました。木戸侯と私は、何なる反抗にもせよこれが出来るかを數次に亘つて討議しました。私共兩人は動亂發生を豫想し、藍海大臣、參謀總長、軍令部總長のみならず、在京各頭圍長及び各部長をも御召になりました、この點にしする陛下の御旨を充分に理解させた上で、卷の旨陛下に奏上いたしました。陛下は米内大將、阿南大將を御召になりました。兩人は考慮いたしますと御返事

申し上げましたが、米内大將は後刻治安秩序維護は全責任を以てこれに當りますと奏上いたしましたので、陛下からはこれ以上に御沙汰はありませんでした。

木戸侯は八月十二日頃からは、治安維持に出來得る限りの援助を盡すために常に宮中に留まり侍臣も退出を許しませんでした。侯爵は私斗條理受講に熱心な各文武官と接觸も屢々しまして、私が彼との懇談から知り得た所であります。此はボツダム宣言受講を熱心に支持し、又他人をもこの方へ導かんと努力して居たことであります。最後に至つて八月十四日連合國よりの回答受領後、陛下に拜謁いたし、國內狀勢を收拾すべからざるに至るやも計られぬ煩れがありますから、一刻も猶豫せず、退台の候件を受講せよと政府に命令され、様にと諭めいたしました。侯爵は又鈴木直樹と接觸し、兩人にて陛下に拜謁を請願し、首相から御前會議召集を奏請しました。御前會議は同日侍召集され、其の時に總理がお盡されたのであります。

これは八月十五日朝のことであります。近衛師団に叛變が起り、木戸侯爵が企てられました。これを聞いた侯爵は宮内省地下室に逃れました。

ましては同一園の者が更に暗殺を企て八月十六日侯爵の弟の家に持参けて行つた事實もありました。木戸侯と私との個人的な公私の方渺から見ましても、父侯爵乃至他の多くの人々との懇談から考へましても、父侯爵乃至他の多くの私には判る)のであります。侯爵は如何なる時に於いても決して争を可といたしませんでした。却つて反対に侯爵は最高の努力を盡して日本の車部を抑へんとしたのであります。内大臣としての地位に在るが故に、侯爵は車部抑制に不^可の努力を盡すに當つて非常に困難な立場に置かれてあつたのであります。政権を掌握せんとする車部の總へんなき辻は走めて大きなものであつて、何なる人でも異議では、父^は何なるに^はでも小^はいでは此度の争は到底^は防し得なかつた程、車部の辻に近い大なるもの^はの努力を施つて居たのであります。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月廿六日於

極東國際軍事裁判所

供述者 松平康昌

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ
證明シマス

同日於

立會人 穂積重威

宣

誓

書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ默秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セ
ザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

松

平

康

昌

12 10 10

855

「機密に」と「公」この間に「於て」を挿入。
「政治に」と「諱諱」の間に「憲法に」を挿入。
「此の事により」以下の文を左記の通り訂正
「此の事が公をして内大臣を滅ぶに當つて細心の注意を施
はしたのであります。」

9 9 9 5 頁

14 14 / 3 行

誤
宮内大臣　内大臣　争
手
「何故」と「新首相采擷の手續」との間に「疑惑を受けた
い様な」と挿入。
「それは疑問の余地のない所でありますか」を末梢

文書番號二五〇三
松平家當
由本文訂正

21 21 20.20 19 19 19 18 17 16 15 12 12

12 3 11 10 14 8 7 12 2 4 10 13 11

行ヨリ 14行左記の如く訂正

これはかりでなく このことは更に

「的となつた事實によつても明であります」

内大臣の職は 内大臣の職を

五大臣閣議 五相閣議

左の如く訂正

「親夷親木派と極端主義者及連貫に反對の人々との兩方に

思質なる上から より」

「親夷親木派と極端主義者及連貫に反對の人々との兩方に

思質なる上から より」

忠實ならんとして

陛下の御心

申し上げる

亦立憲政局の専横を追んで御遵守になりました。」と訂正

御心へ傳への一端とする目的である」と訂正

内大臣の職を

職務

そこで

それから

正公務

御心へ傳への一端とする目的である」と訂正

32 32 32 30 30 27 24. 23 23 23 23

12 4 115 7 15 7 11 10 2 2 2

之に代る

何等の

「女協衆を」の次に「も」を挿入

示
前
訓
令

勿
受
付
示

「けれども」を「この状態では」の前に挿入

前
除
受
諾

受
付
示

前
除
受
諾

文末に左記の暗句挿入

左の如く訂正

「か臺には陛下の御視臨もなく木戸侯も出席しませんでした」

「このでめることを天に勧告するためと云ふことを明言して

内大臣との○○」

反対派に與せられる

反対派の味方に引込まれ

絶終

纏縷

重岡

重
部

「陛下は之を御諒められられ」と訂正

頁

行

三三頁九行目
三三頁一二行目
三四頁八行目
三五頁七行目
三五頁九行目
三五頁一三行目
三六頁三行目

誤

正

御洩し
御曉し
モスコ一の司様は遂に得られませんでしたト訂正
御贊意
御賛納
左の如く訂正

「私が彼女の命懸から知り得た所による事之は、
ホツタム宣言受諾を熱心に力説し之等の人をこの
考へ方へ導かんと努力して居たのであります」
「連合國よりの回答受領終」の次「陛下の
に「八月十四日に木戸侯は」の語句を挿入
夜」」」を削除
「侯爵さの書類及私さ他の」ト訂正